In the early “industrialization” construction of the Soviet Union, the source of funds was an urgent problem for the authorities to solve. Sokina’s book “Foreign Guest Stores in the Soviet Union: Funds Needed for Industrialization” reveals the method of raising funds at that time from the special existence of foreign guest stores in this special period: borrowing foreign debts and buying gold preserved by residents. Mr. Wen Yi of Soviet Russia made an analysis of this book.
“Time flies, years leave marks-thoughts after reading” [h/] Wen Yi (new issue of Reading in 2021)
In my experience and memory of studying the history of the Soviet Union, the industrialization of the Soviet Union has always been the standard to measure the success or failure of the historical process of the Soviet Union. In a series of papers on the Soviet Union, there are three criteria to measure and evaluate “industrialization”: first, how the Politburo headed by Stalin decides the policies and specific measures of “industrialization”; Second, how the leaders of the CPSU split into two opposing factions because of their different decisions on “industrialization”; Third, the issue of “industrialization” has been entangled in the issue of “heavy industry” or “light industry” as the core of national development.
The above three problems are all concentrated in the political field, and they are all based on the correctness of ideology. It seems that there are few people in our generation. If there are, we should study the “industrialization” of the Soviet Union from the perspective of economy, people’s livelihood and the future of the country. People have always been convinced of Stalin’s decision as to the source of funds for direct industrialization advocated and promoted by Stalin: “overall collectivization of agriculture” is the main source of funds for industrialization, and “direct industrialization” and “overall collectivization of agriculture” are the quick ways for the Soviet Union to surpass the industrialization process of western capitalist countries for hundreds of years in a very short five-year plan period.
In a word, we have a political macro-judgment on the “industrialization” of the Soviet Union, but we lack a subtle and in-depth analysis of a case. The book “Foreign Inn in the Soviet Union: Gold Needed by Industrialization” (hereinafter referred to as “Foreign Inn”) provides us with a new understanding of the “industrialization” of the Soviet Union from a microscopic perspective, from the perspective of economy, people’s livelihood and the future of the country, and shows a picture closer to the historical truth.
Foreign Hotels in the Soviet Union —— Gold Needed by Industrialization
Shi Haijie translated by yelena Alek Sandrov Na Osokina
Life reading Xinzhi Sanlian Bookstore 2020-08
Foreign inn. The book points out the differences and struggles of Soviet leaders on the issue of industrialization in an understatement. It does not interpret the issue of industrialization from the differences of ideology, and it does not go beyond the issue of capital. It makes a political ultimate conclusion on industrialization. The theme of this book is about the source of funds for industrialization, which in essence provides a researcher and ordinary readers who are willing to know the truth about industrialization in the Soviet Union. It can be said that “Foreign Guest Shop” is a big curtain on the stage, and the author Osokina opened the curtain to show people the panoramic “secret realm” of Soviet industrialization.
The foreign inn reveals the essence of the capital problem of “industrialization” from three aspects. First, the funds for “industrialization” do not come from the accumulation of agriculture, but from borrowing foreign debts from western countries; Second, the guarantee of foreign debt is the gold reserve of Russian treasury and the private property of gold preserved by residents; Third, the sharp drop in gold caused by “crazy export” and the “continuous debt repayment” caused by high foreign debt have become the strange circle in the “industrialization” period.
The “industrialization” of the Soviet Union did not begin in 1931, but as early as 1924. Stalin had a mature idea of “industrialization”. I wrote in “A General History of Russia (1917-1991)” that Stalin “mainly considered three points: first, not building a new factory and quickly resuming military production with limited funds; Second, do not build factories on the frontier to avoid the destruction of war; The third is to arrange for rear enterprises to prepare for war. ” Stalin’s consideration is not only for the security of the new Soviet Union, but also because the Soviet Union has no money in its pocket and is seriously short of funds for “industrialization”. Therefore, Stalin warned Molotov several times to “resolutely guarantee that during this period, no Soviet-scale factory can be built without the approval of the Politburo.”
General History of Russia (1917-1991)
writing
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press 2013-06
All the funds for “industrialization” in this period were used for the national inventory in the Russian era. Foreign tourist shops provide accurate figures in this regard. It was through “exporting” these gold that the Soviet Union was able to purchase the equipment and technology needed for “industrialization” and introduce relevant technicians. The United States was recognized by the Soviet authorities as the first country to introduce equipment, technology and personnel, so the Soviet gold first flowed to the United States, and the United States became the first country to rely on the Soviet Union for “industrialization.” As revealed by foreign guest shops, by 1927/1928, the import expenditure, that is, “gold export”, was higher than the expenditure income, that is, the investment in equipment, technology and personnel was higher than 171 million rubles of gold. This is a terrible figure, which conceals the great difficulties and risks faced by the newly born Soviet Union: grain (agricultural) production, the source of funds recognized and hoped by Soviet leaders, has shrunk severely, the export price of grain has fallen by two-thirds, and the agricultural economy is on the verge of collapse. In addition, the world market prices of timber and oil, the country’s two largest export resources, have also fallen sharply, first of all due to the impact of the economic crisis sweeping the United States.
Front and back of czar’s gold coin
Therefore, 1927/1928 was described by Sokina as the year of “crazy import”! Since the beginning of this year, “imports” have increased crazily year by year, while exports have decreased crazily year by year. As a result, the investment in equipment, technology and employees needed for “industrialization” also increased wildly, and the foreign debt of the Soviet Union surged. This situation reached its peak in 1931. “Foreign Guest Shop” describes it like this: “Exports are calculated in cash, imports depend on loans, and the country is slowly falling into the abyss of debt.” “The Soviet Union’s gold reserves and newly mined gold have reached dangerously low levels. The country has to find a new way out and make a new decision on the issue of “industrialization” funds. Osokina pointed out in “Foreign Guest Shop” that the biggest change in policy was the replacement of Soviet foreign trade partners, and Germany replaced the United States as the main creditor of the Soviet Union. In other words, advanced technology and equipment are mainly imported from Germany, and German experts are introduced, and Russian gold also flows into Germany in large quantities from the Soviet Union. Germany became an indispensable supporter and ally of the “industrialization” of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union’s dependence on Germany, the massive influx of Soviet gold into the German treasury, and the resulting close economic cooperation and political relations between the Soviet Union and Germany continued until Hitler’s undeclared war against the Soviet Union, and the German artillery shells stopped the train full of materials bound for Germany.
With the change of this policy, the issue of “gold” has not only become the key to the Soviet Union’s foreign trade, but also the core of whether the Soviet Union’s “industrialization” can continue to survive and develop. The figures quoted in Foreign Guest Shop confirm this point: “In 1930, the Soviet Union imported 251 million rubles from Germany, with a deficit of 45 million rubles. In 1931, at the height of the “import frenzy”, the Soviet Union bought more than 400 million rubles of goods in Germany (more than twice the amount imported from the United States), and the Soviet Union’s trade deficit with Germany reached a huge scale-more than 280 million rubles. In order to solve the shortage of gold resources, the Soviet Union formally established a “foreign guest shop”. At first, it should have collected hard currency from “foreign guests” from the Soviet Union-equipment engineers and technicians, import experts and crew members moored at the port, that is, paid the funds needed for Soviet industrialization from foreigners’ pockets. Later, due to the widening gold gap, “foreign guests’ shops” had to be opened to Soviet citizens, that is, to take “industrialized” money from the pockets of ordinary people. This change in the management direction of “foreign guest shops” does not bode well, nor does it mean that the state should take measures to benefit the people in consideration of the hardships of people’s livelihood. Osokina believes that this is the reason why the “foreign inn” that originally served foreigners turned to Soviet citizens only, and it is a dangerous sign that the “industrialized” capital chain is about to break.
Advertisements sent abroad by foreign guests’ shops
The so-called limited opening to Soviet citizens can be described by a sentence in Osokina’s book: “If there is no gold, please go away. There is gold. Welcome to the store. ” When we look at this “foreign hotel” today, it seems that we can’t forget the background of its opening and the process of its opening to ordinary citizens. At that time, the Soviet Union was implementing the first five-year plan, announcing that the planned economy was superior to the market economy, showing the world that the socialist system was superior to the capitalist system of western countries with its own industrialization, and announcing that it would “catch up with the beauty of the Premier League” in two or three five-year plans. Therefore, the state monopoly, rigid planning indicators, the supply of vouchers for major industrial products and physical objects are the characteristics of that era, and the requirement of ideological unity is the norm and moral standard of all actions, while the “foreign guest shop” and its opening to citizens holding gold are contrary to these norms and standards, which is a disorderly and opposite action. However, the Soviet authorities still make high-profile use of the product of the contradiction of “foreign guests’ shops”, which shows how dangerous the shortage of foreign exchange (gold) resources and the foreign trade deficit are at this time, how difficult the “industrialization” process of the Soviet Union was in the 1930s, and how serious the difficulties and crises it faced. The operation of “foreign guest shops” in contradiction should not only maintain long-term moral standards, but also take into account the needs of immediate interests. However, “foreign guest shops” and a series of measures of “economic freedom” collected a considerable amount of gold for the import and export of the Soviet Union. It is from these gold that the industrialization of the Soviet Union passed the most critical period, ensuring the transition from “direct industrialization” in the 1930s to “national defense and industrial militarization”. In addition, when “foreign guest shops” settle their business with gold, the pricing is unequal. The gold income price of “foreign guest shop” is very low, and the selling price is much higher than the income price. Therefore, Mr. Sokina described “taking money from citizens’ pockets” as a deprivation.
The appearance of foreign guests’ shops
The five-year existence of foreign guests’ shops in the Soviet Union also proved one thing: in the 1930s, the Soviet government used almost all its foreign exchange (gold) reserves to buy equipment, technology and raw materials needed for “industrialization” and did not substantially help citizens improve their lives. However, the decline of agricultural economy caused by natural and man-made disasters and the famine that swept across a large area also had a profound impact on the existence and activities of “foreign guest shops”. The limited opening of “foreign guest shops” was originally intended to provide convenience for “citizens with gold”, but in the difficult period of famine in the 1930s, “foreign guest shops” also had to import food and light industrial products urgently needed by the Soviet Union. In his book, Osokina describes the subtle relationship between the Great Famine and “foreign inns” and the measures taken by the authorities to deal with the famine: “With the outbreak of the Great Famine, the most scarce commodity in foreign inns is flour-people buy bagged flour, and foreign inns are often out of stock. In 1933, the planned import volume of foreign tourists’ shops was the largest, reaching 10 million rubles, but excluding flour. At that time, the Soviet Union was still dumping grain into the western market, and only bought a small amount of rice in the name of “Three” under the import plan. In the import plan of 1933, meat and animal fat were the main products, and grain imports only accounted for 16%. The figures quoted in the Foreign Guest Shop show that during the “crazy import” period of the first Five-Year Plan, the “industrialization” process of the Soviet Union was almost entirely concentrated in two fields closely related to gold foreign exchange, one was the gold mining industry itself, and the other was the “foreign guest shop” with a prosperous business.
Interior of foreign guest shop
Although the five-year existence of the “foreign guest shop” collected the necessary foreign exchange (gold) for the country, it had a much greater and deeper impact on the social life of ordinary people in the Soviet Union. First of all, the “foreign hotel” artificially created an “unequal and unjust” special zone “within the” equal and just socialism “system. In this “special zone”, socialism and capitalism coexist. Second, the principle of the proletariat no longer works. It is currency that dominates and exerts its core strength, and what the country urgently needs is “industrialized” foreign exchange marked by gold. Thirdly, in this contradictory “special zone”, people no longer have class attributes, and gold gives their owners privileges that ordinary citizens cannot have. Finally, the dignitaries who controlled the gold and foreign exchange power on the line of “foreign guests’ shops” evolved into moths that destroyed the Soviet socialist building from the inside.
One of the coupons for foreign guests’ shops-Jin Gebi
Judging from a series of figures in foreign guests’ shops, the Soviet leaders at that time made serious mistakes in the decision-making on the source of funds for “industrialization”. First, they didn’t really understand the national conditions of the Soviet Union, mistakenly thought that the funds for “industrialization” could be “self-raised”, especially the judgment of agricultural development was very serious, so they took radical measures that did not meet the rural reality and farmers’ needs. Second, they misjudged the international situation at that time, thinking that in the economic crisis that swept the western world, all the former industrialized countries would perish, and only the “industrialization” of the Soviet Union would produce new cadres. However, this is not the case. The Soviet Union had to settle for second best and import technology, equipment and experts from the United States, Germany and a series of European countries. Third, they misjudged the economic development model, and thought that “market economy” was an absolute dead end, while “planned economy” was a good policy for Qiang Bing, a rich country, and they were unwilling to face up to the famine and dangerous situation and take practical improvement and rescue measures. At the time of crisis, he decided to combine western technology with planned economy, and judged that this combination method could create a miracle of prosperity. Fourth, they misjudged the speed and achievements of the Soviet Union’s “industrialization” and thought that the Soviet Union’s “industrialization” would be completed within two or three “five-year plans”, and a socialist power Soviet Union was just around the corner. “Catch up with the beauty of the Premier League” is a typical symbolic slogan during the Soviet industrialization period. It not only shows the great goal and ambition of Soviet industrialization, but also exposes its loopholes and defects. The core of misjudgment here is speed and result. They think that speed and results can be created by manpower, but the reality is that the speed and results of “industrialization” in the Soviet Union are far from the leaders’ decisions. Fifth, they misjudged the decisive power of people’s heart, feelings and conditions in the process of “industrialization”, and thought that “people’s heart, feelings and conditions” were controllable and did not regard them as the foundation and ultimate goal of “industrialization”
The foreign guests’ shop is a case, which only reveals one aspect of the Soviet Union’s industrialization process, tells the story of gold as an industrial capital, and the closely related part of the Soviet Union’s “people’s heart, people’s feelings and people’s feelings”. Foreign visitors’ shops are only a key to a deeper understanding of Soviet industrialization, but they cannot be the key to unlocking all the secrets of Soviet industrialization. There are also some key issues closely related to “industrialization”, such as the high-level decision-making, mechanism and process of selling gold, the decision-making and implementation of gold flowing into western countries, especially Germany, how the Soviet-German relationship deepened and expanded on the basis of “gold” in the “crazy years” and how it profoundly affected the “industrialization” of the Soviet Union.